Abstract-Three-Dimensional Networks-on-Chips (3D-NoCs) have been proposed as an auspicious solution, merging the high parallelism of the Network-on-Chip (NoC) paradigm with the high-performance and low-power cost of 3D-ICs. However, as technology scales down, the reliability issues are becoming more crucial, especially for complex 3D-NoC which provides the communication requirements of multi and manycore systems-on-chip. Reliability assessment is prominent for early stages of the manufacturing process to prevent costly redesigns of a target system. In this paper, we present an accurate reliability assessment and quantitative evaluation of a soft-error resilient 3D-NoC based on a soft-error resilient mechanism. The system can recover from transient errors occurring in different pipeline stages of the router. Based on this analysis, the effects of failures in the network's principal components are determined.
I. INTRODUCTION
Global interconnects are becoming the largest performance bottleneck for high-performance Multi/Manycore Systems-on-Chip (MSoCs). For more than a decade, Network-on-Chip (NoC) interconnects have been proposed as a promising solution for future MSoC designs [1] . The NoC paradigm offers more scalability than conventional shared-bus interconnects and allows more processing elements (PEs) to be efficiently integrated into a single chip. Despite the higher scalability and parallelism offered by a NoC system over traditional shared-bus based systems, it is still not an ideal solution for future large scale MSoCs. This is due to some limitations such as high power consumption and low throughput from NoCs with large dimensions. Taking NoCs to the third dimension has been proposed to deal with the above problems, as it was a solution offering lower power consumption and higher speeds [2] , [3] .
As feature sizes and supply voltages continually decrease, systems that have implemented these interconnects have become more vulnerable to soft errors. Shivakumar et al. [4] analyzed the transient error trends for smaller transistors and showed that the occurrence rate of transient faults is significantly higher than permanent faults. In particular, they expect the transient error rate for combinational logic to increase dramatically. Currently, soft error handling is mostly focused on memory and latches error which can be tackled by Error Correction Code. Therefore, future integration systems need a suitable solution to deal with soft errors.
Recently, numerous techniques have been proposed to handle soft errors [5] - [8] in NoCs; however, the reliability of the proposed techniques is still not well investigated. The most conventional method to evaluate the error resilience is injecting faults into the system and checking the output's accuracy. This kind of evaluation, especially at the gate level, requires a massive amount of time and computing resources. Moreover, the correction module is not sufficiently investigated in the reliability evaluation stage. Although the correction module helps to handle fault occurrences, it also suffers from an increase in fault probability.
In this paper, we present an efficient soft-error resilient mechanism and architecture for reliable 3D-NoC systems. We also present an accurate formulation of the reliability and vulnerability of the proposed 3D-NoC architecture against soft-errors. Our assessment method is based on the M arkov state model [9] . The fault-tolerance architecture is modeled as several states that include all of the possible failure cases. To switch between states, the repairability, and the failure rate is required. Based on the state model, a reliability function can be generated using probability functions. Moreover, this paper presents a metric named the Reliability Acceleration Factor (RAF). This parameter is used to separate the reliability from the technology parameters, or operating conditions. By using the characteristics of the architecture and its fault-tolerance mechanism, the RAF value only represents the efficiency of the fault-tolerance mechanism alone.
II. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE OVERVIEW
The 3D-Network-on-Chip (3D-ONoC) router block diagram is shown in Fig. 1 . The router has three pipeline stages: (1) BW (Buffer Writing), (2) NPC/SA (Next Port Computation and Switch Allocation), and (3) CT (Crossbar Traversal). The router architecture contains seven Input-port modules for each direction in addition to the Switch-Allocation and the Crossbar module, which handle the transfer of flits to the next node. The Input-port module is composed of two main elements: Input-buffer and the Next-Port-Routing module. Incoming flits from the previous node or the local core, are first stored in the Input-buffer. Since 3D-ONoC uses a LookAhead routing algorithm, the output port value is already calculated by the previous node/core. Therefore, the outputport value is sent with request signal to the Switch Allocation module. At the same time, the Next-Port-Computing module uses the routing information (destination and output-port) to calculate the routing i nformation for the next node, labeled as next-output-port. With the grant from Switch Allocation, the flit will be sent through the Crossbar to the next node together with the next-output-port value.
A. Soft-error Resilient Mechanism
Our main goal in proposing the SER-3DR (Soft-Error Resilient 3D-Network-on-Chip Router) is to develop a highlyreliable and low-cost technique to recover from soft-errors in all pipeline stages of the router.
For the errors in the pipeline stages, we propose a Soft Error Resilient Algorithm (SERA) , as shown in Algorithm 1. In the baseline OASIS-NoC, the router has three pipeline stages: BW (Buffer Writing), NPC/SA (Next Port Computing and Switch Allocation in parallel) and CT (Crossbar Traversal). Since the NPC/SA stage (Routing and Arbitrating) is where a majority of the complex combinational logic exists and it executes routing for the router, this stage is the one we selected for the SERA algorithm.
As illustrated in Algorithm 1, SERA routes a flit from an input port to an output port. The input flit's data (in flit) is first written into the input buffer during the BW (Buffer Writing) stage (line 1). Second, SERA executes the firsttime NPC (NextPortComputing) and SA (SwitchAllocation) stages which output the next port [1] and grants [1] respectively (lines 3-4). The NextPortComputing computes the routing path for the next node, similar to the look- ahead routing algorithm, and the SwitchAllocation handles the input port to output port routing. Third, the redundant processes of the NPC and SA are performed with these outputs: next port [2] and grants [2] (lines 4-5). In the next step, SERA compares the outputs of the original and the redundant processes. If next port [1] is different from next port [2] , a soft-error occurred in the NPC, the algorithm then calculates the NPC a third time and uses majority voting to decide the final value (line 7-8). Otherwise, the final value is assigned as the first result (line 10). The SA is also processed in a similar fashion to the NPC: it starts by determining the occurrence of any errors, then voting on a value or assigning the first value (line 12-17). After detection and recovery, SERA finishes with crossbar traversal (line 18). The flit will be forwarded to the next node in the routing path or to the local core.
III. RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT

A. Mean Time Between Failure
In this section, we present a methodology to calculate the reliability of the system using the Markov State Model and the reliability function [9] . The reliability of a system with respect to soft errors can be evaluated using the Mean-TimeBetween-Failure calculation that follows:
where R(s) is the reliability function of the system in the Laplace domain [9] , which can be calculated based on the Markov state models as shown in Fig. 2 . Each state S i of the Markov model represents a possible status of the system. The status is defined as each case where an element of the system fails, which can lead to unpredictable operations. If the operation in S i state is correct, we define this state as "healthy". If the system is unable to operate correctly in state S i , we define this state as "faulty".
Assuming the system has a set S which includes states from S 0 to S m in its Markov state model. We use S 0 to represent the initial state of the system. The set of healthy states and set of faulty states are defined as:
F {S i ∈ S|the system not working}
where:
• H is the set of states which still maintain the operation of the system, • F is the set of states which the system fails. The reliability function R(s) in Equation 1 is defined as follows: • λ is the fault rate a component in the system which can represent for a transition from a element of set H to a element of set F.
Faulty States Healthy States
ߤ (୬ାଶ)ିଶ Δ‫ݐ‬
• μ is the repair rate a component in the system which can represent for a transition from a element of set F to the element of set H. The final MTBF can be calculated based on the healthy states as:
B. Fault Model
Before analyzing the reliability of the system and calculating the MTBF, we need make two assumptions about the failure of the system.
• The system starts with a default all components healthy state. In Fig. 2 , the initial status is: S 0 = 1 and S i = 0 with i = 0.
• The transition rate λ and μ are constants and perdetermined. However, the fault rate and repair rate depend on the technology parameters, running environment and operating circumstances. In order to separate them from the fault rate value, we propose these assumptions:
• The fault rate has a linear relationship to the area cost of the module.
• The fault rate has a linear relationship to the operating time of the module.
• The fault rate is affected after the module is attached to a system. In this fashion, the fault rate only depends on the area cost, the operating time and the efficiency of the reduction of the fault rate that is provided by the fault-tolerance mechanism. Thus, for a system with k components, its fault rate is given by:
• unit is a select module as a reference for calculation.
In our method, we use the original design as a unit.
• OR i is the operating time ratio of component i to unit.
• AR i is the area cost ratio of component i to unit.
• f i is the changing rate caused by attaching the module i to the system. If the system has no impact to the failure of module i or module i is standalone, f i = 1. If the system has a fault-tolerance mechanism for module i, f i < 1. Soft errors occur over a short period of time, typically within a single clock cycle. Because of this, the combinational logic has the ability to self-correct soft errors. On the other hand, the memory units (latch, flip-flop,...) still record failures.
C. Reliability Evaluation
In order to evaluate a fault-tolerance method, we introduce a parameter named the Reliability Acceleration Factor (RAF), which is defined as:
where MTBF F T and MTBF original are Mean Time Between Failures of the Fault-Tolerant and the original system, respectively. Based on analysis of the operation of the original and fault-tolerant system, we can obtain both MTBFs using Equation 5 . Moreover, by using Equation 7, the RAF parameter is separate from the fault rate of the unit module. In this fashion, the RAF parameter only represents the efficiency of the fault-tolerance mechanism. In order to evaluate a fault-tolerant system which consists of both original modules and correction modules, we model the fault-tolerant system to have a Markov state similar to Fig. 3 (b) with:
• S 0 is the initial state.
• S 1 in Fig. 3 (b) is the failure state of the original system which is given by a transition rate λ D1 .
• S 2 in Fig. 3 (b) is the failure state of the original system which is given by a transition rate λ D2 . Fig. 3 (b) is the failure state of the repair module. Because of the protection from the fault-tolerance technique, the FT system can handle some kinds of faults. Therefore, we define the transition rates as:
• λ D is the fault rate of the original system (D).
• λ C is the fault rate of the repair module of the FT system. • μ D is the repair rate which is provided by the repair module (C).
• λ D1 is the part of the fault rate in the original which is handled by the repair module (C).
• λ D2 is the part of the fault rate in the original which the repair module (C) cannot correct. Based on the Markov state of the two systems, as shown in Fig. 3 , the MTBFs are given as:
and
By applying Equations 6, 8, and 9 to Equation 7, we have:
• f D = λ D2 /λ D is the ratio of the failure rate of the original system after and before applying the faulttolerance mechanism.
• OC x is the ratio of operation of the module x to the original system (D).
• AR x is the ratio of area cost of the module x to the original system (D). Equation 10 shows the RAF function based on the architecture modifications in area cost and operation and the reduction of the failure rate.
IV. DESIGN AND EVALUATION RESULTS
Our proposed system (SER-3DR) is integrated into the 3D-ONoC [2] , [3] . We designed the system in Verilog-HDL, and synthesized it using the 45nm technology library. We evaluated the hardware complexity, power consumption and speed. We also evaluated performance using three benchmarks: Matrix-multiplication, Transpose, and Uniform were selected. For comparison, we also implemented and simulated the baseline LAFT-OASIS [2] , and Triple Modular Redundancy of the NPC/SA based on OASIS (TMR) [5] . In order to demonstrate the reliability, we analyze our architecture to provide the RAF parameter in Eq. (10) and provide some comparison with another mechanism. Table I depicts the implementation result of a single router of the original OASIS system, the TMR router [5] , and the proposed SER-3DR router. The router is designed for a 3D Mesh with 7 ports, 32 bit flit-width, Stall-Go flow control and wormhole forward mechanism. When compared with the original LAFT-OASIS router architecture, the SER-3DR requires slightly more logic area cost (14.98%). The TMR router costs 45.20% more because it triplicates the NPC and SA stage. The frequency decreases from 801.28 MHz to 655.74 MHz (−18.16%). Also, the TMR system increases the power consumption to 30.31 mW (+18.30%). The proposed design slightly increases the power consumption from the baseline's 25.62 mW to 27.13 mW (+5.90%). 
A. Hardware Complexity
B. Network Performance Evaluation
For this evaluation, we used the three benchmarks over five injection rates : 0%, 8.33%, 16.67%, 11.11%&6.67% (in Routing and Switch Allocator) and 33%. The evaluation results with Transpose and Uniform are shown in Fig. 4  (a and b) , respectively. We perform these benchmarks for 3 models (SER-3DR, LAFT-OASIS and the TMR). The network transmission time or average delay is presented as a bar graph. We also inject the soft-errors inside the baseline model (LAFT-OASIS) and measure the transmission time.
Its failure time and complete finish time are depicted in line graph format.
For the Transpose benchmark in Fig. 4(a) , we found that the average latency slightly increased from 20.113 cycless to 20.505 cycles (+1.95%) for an error injection rate of 0%. With different error injection rates, we can see that the average latency slightly increased from 20.505 cycles for a 0% error rate to 21.092 cycles for a 33% error rate. Uniform benchmark has a 9.06% increase in transmission time with an absence of faults, while Matrix has a 10.02% additional transmission time. In the faulty cases, SER-3DR requires additional intervals for detecting and recovery.
To perform the throughput evaluation, we also used the above benchmarks with five injection rates as shown in Fig. 4 (c and d) . For the Uniform benchmark, the throughput is slightly degraded due to the short packet length which increases the impact of redundant cycles.
C. Reliability Comparison
In this section, we compare the soft error resilience technique designed for the two modules: Routing and Switch Allocation. We select the TMR and two architectures from [7] , [8] . The architecture by Prodromou et al. [8] and Yu et al. [7] use monitors to verify the accuracy of the output values. To verify the output value, they predefine a set of rules based on the architecture of the monitored modules. If the output value violates one of the rules, the monitor module can determine the failure and decide the next step. The architecture by Yu et al. [7] allows the system to reexecute the task again to correct the failure. Prodromou et al. [8] does not provide any recovery method for the detected failure. Although the set of faults for the routing and arbitrating modules consists of 7 and 13 faults, we assume both architectures can handle 100% of transient faults in this evaluation.
For our proposal [5] and Yu et al. [7] , we use Eq. 10 to calculate the RAF value. The reliability function of TMR is obtained from [9] . The original module is not modified to implement the fault-tolerance architecture. Therefore, the area cost and operating ratios (AR D and OR D ) of the protected module both equal 1. Since the operation of the correction module follows the operation of the protected module, the operating ratios of the correction module OR C are both equal to 1. The area ratios AR C of the correction module are shown in Table II . Since our proposal can handle 100% kind of the error, we assume that Yu et al. [7] also has the same capacity.
As shown in Table II , our proposed architecture has a medium area cost overhead (54.46%). Both monitor based architectures have a small area overhead (9% and 3%). The TMR architecture has the largest area cost (+204.33%) but it has the least impact on performance and architecture modification. Although monitor based architectures provide a small area overhead, they only cover the faults which violate their set of rules. Therefore, a new architecture requires another set of rules to handle soft errors. On the other hand, our proposal and TMR can cover 100% kind of transient fault and adapt to any architecture without significant modifications.
In terms of RAF (Reliability Acceleration Factor), the TMR attains a value of around 1.33. Our architecture provides a RAF of 1.84. For monitor-based architectures, Yu et al. [7] provides the best protection with 11.11; however, this value is attained under the assumption that the design will cover 100% of failures. The architecture by Prodromou et al. [8] does not improve due to the fact that they did not implement a recovery module.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented an accurate reliability assessment and quantitative evaluation of a soft-error resilient 3D-NoC system based on a soft-error resilient mechanism. The system can recover from transient errors occurring in different pipeline stages of the router. Evaluation results show that the system has about 1.84 times improvement in MTBF while handling 100% of all tested error types. Moreover, the system can achieve a high level of transient error protection with a small latency increase of 18.16% when compared to the baseline non-protected system. 
